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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Since the structural adjustment policies of the 1980s, 
policymaking at a national and continental level has 
increasingly turned to agricultural commercialisation 
as the foundation for Africa’s long-term nutrition 
and food security. However, socio-economic 
inequalities, land tenure and food insecurity, as 
well as livelihood and income precarities remain 
widespread challenges. Social differentiation within 
African agriculture today is the result of long-term 
processes of socio-economic and agrarian change, 
local to global power relations, agricultural and other 
policies, as well as shocks and stressors, including 
climate change, natural disasters and pandemics; 
and the ways that individuals act in response to these 
factors. The effects of shocks, such as COVID-19 
have overlaid emergent and entrenched patterns of 
social differentiation that shape access to resources, 
markets, and other opportunities for those involved 
in commercial agriculture. Intersecting social groups 
have responded to long-term processes of agrarian 
change and shocks and stressors in different ways.  
This paper draws upon the findings of the Agricultural 
Policy Research in Africa Programme (APRA), which 
began its research activities in 2016 to study the 
consequences of different pathways to agricultural 
commercialisation across value chains in six countries: 
Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi, Nigeria, Tanzania, and 
Zimbabwe. In 2020 research teams in each of 
the countries conducted further research which 
considered the impacts of COVID-19 on these value 
chains, drawing upon political settlements frameworks 
to inform their analysis. This paper asks:
1. What can political settlements analyses tell us 
about agricultural value chains and responses to 
COVID-19 in the countries studied? and 
2. How are structures and power relations throughout 
the value chains and actors’ responses to 
COVID-19 related to social differentiation in the 
context of African agriculture?
Answering these questions involves understanding 
how long-term, politically influenced patterns of change 
have shaped social differentiation in ways that in turn 
affect the ability of different actors to respond to shocks. 
Furthermore, it involves understanding the recursive 
effect of those shocks on social differentiation.
Smallholder agriculture provides most of the production 
in all the countries and value chains studied, although 
the extent to which farmers participate in markets 
or are supported to do so varies between contexts. 
Each of the study countries have developed policy 
strategies to support smallholder and larger-scale 
farmers at different times, which have sometimes 
sought to address, but may have further entrenched 
social differentiation. Each of the countries studied 
has value chain structures, political and socio-cultural 
systems and practices that are context specific, albeit 
embedded in globalised trade systems. Rather than 
seeking to identify rules or universal trends, we look at 
different processes of change across time and space, 
while highlighting patterns of social differentiation that 
appear to be common across contexts.
The most significant marker of social difference in 
processes of agricultural commercialisation across 
the six APRA countries is the distinction between 
small-scale and large-scale producers. Underlying 
this distinction are intersecting facets of social 
identity, including gender and kinship status, ethnicity 
and migrancy/local citizenship, class/wealth status 
and age. To understand the social and economic 
consequences of commercialisation processes in 
practice, it is essential to consider the complexity of 
interactions between these facets of identity and wider 
processes of agrarian change. Different aspects of 
identity overlap, sometimes to create intersectional 
disadvantage. We find that each of these intersecting 
facets of identity underlie the nature of people’s 
engagement in agricultural value chains, both in terms 
of their occupation and social and political capital in the 
value chain, and the degree of management and control 
they may have over agricultural land, and whether they 
are or may become smallholder or large-scale farmers. 
Social differentiation also affects resilience to shocks, 
such as COVID-19, in terms of an actor’s access to 
social, human, and financial capital, and the strategies 
they employ to reduce the risk of negative outcomes 
and increase their resilience capacity. The ways that 
actors respond to shocks are not only shaped by 
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individual agency and access to resources, but also by 
their pre-existing status within family and community, 
and in wider political and social structures.
Findings from the value chain studies discussed in this 
paper, show that larger farm, marketing and processing 
businesses had greater resilience capacities to deal 
with the immediate effects of COVID-19 on access to 
markets and labour. This is because they have been 
advantaged over the longer term by processes of land 
distribution and sometimes by support in accessing 
markets, to the extent that they have accumulated the 
capital to be able to respond to a slowdown in trade 
and unfavourable prices. Larger or more successful 
businesses with access to a reasonable amount of 
liquid capital, rather than only land or plant holding, 
could use it to stockpile goods, buy up cheap goods, 
pay higher transport costs and storage charges, or 
just withstand a period of no trading. Pre-existing 
patterns of social differentiation mean that those who 
are more able to deal with brief shocks are more likely 
to be men, autochthon farmers, and those who are 
already commercially established or wealthier. Those 
who have larger businesses for other reasons are 
also included, where these businesses may be farms 
operating on a greater hectarage, marketing and 
processing businesses turning over greater quantities 
of goods and covering a wide geographical area, and 
with many employees.
The way gender, ethnicity and migrancy as facets of 
identity, interact with processes of social differentiation 
in the face of shocks, depends on the nature of the 
shock and the nature of a group’s resource access 
capability. Women, migrants, young people and the 
poor, as intersecting social groups who are more likely 
to be labourers than landowners, continue to be, overall, 
structurally disadvantaged by social power relations 
embedded within intra-household dynamics, land 
tenure systems and political systems that have shaped 
the agrarian sector over the long term. The result is 
that as women (both as female household heads and 
within female- or male-headed households) are more 
likely to be small-scale business owners, they have 
smaller capital reserves and other resilience capacities 
to withstand the effects of shocks like COVID-19 or turn 
them to their advantage. Smaller businesses are also 
less likely to be able to access temporary business 
relief packages such as loans. However, women and 
migrants who are successful traders or large-account 
farmers are less likely to suffer these effects and will 
have resilience capacities that are comparable to the 
more advantaged groups described above.
The initial COVID-19 response showed that those 
who have abilities and capacities for resilience were 
able to move position within the value chain or even 
move to non-agricultural activities. Actors working at 
the smallest scale are often pursuing multifunctional 
livelihoods. Whilst lacking the capital stocks and 
access to safety nets that can enhance their 
robustness to shocks, they may have skills to support 
a resilient response, including experiences learnt from 
past shocks, for example price fluctuations or new 
regulations that forbid or encourage imports. For many 
agricultural value chain actors in Africa, COVID-19 will 
not be the most severe shock they have experienced, 
while simultaneously resembling other shocks in some 
ways. Other shocks, for example locusts, drought, 
war, market collapse and land loss, have highlighted 
the existing unequal distribution of power and capital 
in a value chain, as well as the resilience of people 
engaged in agricultural value chains and livelihoods 
that are unpredictable.
In the first year of the pandemic, COVID-19 itself had 
the type of short-term effects that result from short-
term market changes such as price fluctuations, 
export bans, or input provision shocks. Early data did 
not show that COVID-19 had caused changes that 
could have a longer-term impact on agrarian relations, 
such as distress land sales or permanent migration. 
However, these types of eventualities could become 
possible as COVID-19 becomes endemic, and unequal 
access to vaccines globally reinforce structural 
inequalities in the rate at which different countries 
are able to recover from the pandemic. It would then 
become more of a stress than a shock. For the time 
being, COVID-19 is more of a shock that accentuates 
existing longer-term patterns of social differentiation. 
In the medium to long term, the effects of COVID-19 
are less predictable. Flows of aid are being affected 
as some developed countries, including the United 
Kingdom, that have racked up huge debts from dealing 
with crises at home seek to reduce their aid budgets, 
although simultaneously some debt repayments, for 
example to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), have 
been paused. These policies, which are also driven by 
political priorities, confer relative advantage on different 
groups and will continue to contribute to patterns and 
structures that shape social differentiation.
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Since the structural adjustment policies (SAPs) of the 
1980s, policymaking at a national and continental level 
has increasingly turned to agricultural commercialisation 
as the foundation for Africa’s long-term nutrition and 
food security. The African Union’s Comprehensive 
Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) 
founded in 2003 established a pan-African approach to 
agricultural transformation and equitable modernisation 
of existing commercial agriculture (Mellor, 2014; Poulton 
et al., 2014). However, socio-economic inequalities, land 
tenure and food insecurity, as well as livelihood and 
income precarities remain widespread challenges. Social 
differentiation within African agriculture today is the result 
of long-term processes of socio-economic and agrarian 
change, local to global power relations, agricultural and 
other policies; as well as shocks and stressors, including 
climate change, natural disasters and pandemics; 
and the ways that individuals act in response to these 
factors. The effects of shocks, such as COVID-19, have 
overlaid emergent and entrenched patterns of social 
differentiation that shape access to resources, markets, 
and other opportunities for those involved in commercial 
agriculture. Intersecting social groups have responded to 
long-term processes of agrarian change and short-term 
shocks in different ways.
Agricultural policy is a politically charged arena, with 
international as well as local interests at play. To 
understand the effects of shocks such as COVID-19 
on social differentiation within African commercial 
agriculture, it is necessary to take a political economy 
approach, examining shocks in the context of political 
and power dynamics in commercial agriculture 
systems. We may then analyse what these dynamics 
imply for the effects of COVID-19 and the responses 
of various actors involved in the changing commercial 
agriculture sector.
Since 2016, APRA has studied the consequences of 
different pathways to agricultural commercialisation 
across six countries: Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi, Nigeria, 
Tanzania, and Zimbabwe. In 2020, research teams 
in each of the six APRA countries conducted further 
research, including key informant interviews, to explore 
the impacts of COVID-19 on value chains for seven 
different crops: maize, rice, sunflower, groundnuts, 
cocoa, palm oil and tobacco, drawing upon political 
settlements frameworks to inform their analysis. This 
paper asks:
1. What can political settlements analyses tell us 
about agricultural value chains and responses to 
COVID-19 in the countries studied? and 
2. How are structures and power relations throughout 
the value chains and actors’ responses to 
COVID-19 related to social differentiation in the 
context of African agriculture?
Answering these questions involves understanding 
how long-term, politically influenced patterns of change 
have shaped social differentiation in ways that in turn 
affect farmers’, marketers’, processors’, exporters’ 
and input providers’ ability to respond to shocks. 
Furthermore, it involves understanding the recursive 
effect of those shocks on social differentiation between 
these value chain actors, and how they are influenced 
by the behaviour of other actors, notably government 
and development partners.
This paper will refer to agricultural ‘value chains’, 
while noting that there is room for a critical take 
on this term (Bair, 2005). The idea that agricultural 
commodities should be transferred along commercial 
chains, accumulating in value, is a policy position and 
normative approach that has grown in the last 20 years 
from the work of Gereffi and others (Gereffi, 2001) and 
has become almost ubiquitous (Ouma, 2015). The term 
has become commonplace in international business 
studies of the agricultural sector, because the notion 
of agriculture acting as an economic driver is attractive 
to governments and donors in Africa, and to larger 
players in the private sector, who can extract value. 
An earlier term that has its roots in world-systems theory 
is ‘commodity chains’. According to world-systems 
theory, social change happens in a spatio-temporal 
‘world’, the scope of which is reproduced by the 
expansion and contraction of labour patterns across 
it (Hopkins and Wallerstein, 1977). The meaning of this 
term has since evolved away from its world-systems 
roots towards a conceptualisation of commodity 
chains as inter-firm networks connected to international 
markets (Gereffi, 1994; see also Bair, 2005). Both 
terms utilise the value-added concept as a basis for 
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policy and commercial decision-making. Neither place 
people at the centre of the picture. Acknowledging 
this, we will use the value chain terminology to describe 
commercial agricultural systems, whilst also taking 
an approach to our research questions and analysis 
which allows us to consider power relations and the 
agency of individual actors: people and politics, rather 
than products and profits, will be the central focus of 
this paper examining social differentiation.
1.1 Agricultural policy in Africa
The African Union’s CAADP of 2003 is a continental 
policy framework for the sector. The overall aims are 
to increase incomes and food and nutrition security 
through agriculture, and it focuses on achieving 
this through greater public investment and private 
sector involvement in farming (Poulton et al., 2014; 
Benin, 2016). There is an element of attention to 
social inclusivity within CAADP. Among other things, 
the June 2014 Malabo Declaration on Accelerated 
Agricultural Growth commits to increasing production 
and reducing losses in an inclusive way, prioritising 
entry of women and youth into agribusiness, and 
integrating agricultural development and social 
protection. The logic CAADP works with is that these 
goals can be achieved by incorporating smallholders 
into more intensive high technology value chains, 
which are often local, by encouraging large-scale 
private sector investment: from large-, medium- and 
small-scale companies, and by including farmers 
operating at different levels. Some commentators 
have seen the policy as being shaped by donor 
agendas (Poulton et al., 2014). The idea that intensified 
smallholder commercialisation can act as a primary 
route to poverty alleviation has also been critiqued by 
other authors as too much of a homogenising narrative 
(Poole, Chitundu and Msoni, 2013).
Hall, Scoones and Tsikata (2015) provide useful context 
on the political nature of agricultural policy trends, 
including in several of the APRA countries, in a way 
that contextualises the CAADP in longer-term trends 
of agricultural policy and investment, including SAPs. 
They note that many African states have historically 
given preferential treatment to investors, including land 
grants, the aim being that foreign direct investment 
would facilitate technology transfer and agrarian 
transformation. Examples of this approach include 
Tanzania’s Development Vision 2025, Ghana’s Food and 
Agriculture Sector Development Policy, and Ethiopia’s 
Agriculture Development Led Industrialisation, as well 
as major land reform programmes throughout Africa 
since the 1990s that have been geared towards 
liberalisation and formalisation of land tenure. These 
policies were developed in the context of the most 
recent ‘global land grab’, of which large-scale land 
acquisitions by foreign and domestic investors are a 
part (Cotula et al., 2009; von Braun and Meinzen-Dick, 
2009; Borras et al., 2011; Cotula, 2013). The trajectory 
of change has been towards large-scale commercial 
production on plantations and large estates owned by 
foreign companies or multinational companies (MNCs) 
in partnership with domestic capital. Medium-scale 
independent commercial farmers also play a role, often 
using capital amassed from outside the agricultural 
sector to start a farm business (Jayne, Chamberlin and 
Headey, 2014; Hall, Scoones and Tskikata, 2017).
While there has been growth in medium-scale 
commercial farms owned or managed by local elites 
(Jayne et al., 2016; Muyanga et al., 2019), small-scale 
commercial farming has continued. Smallholder 
agriculture provides most of the production in all the 
countries and value chains studied, and the extent to 
which farmers participate in markets or are supported 
to do so varies between contexts. Each of the study 
countries have developed policy strategies to support 
smallholder and large-scale farmers at different times, 
which have sometimes sought to address, but may have 
further entrenched social difference. This has tended 
to lead to dualist structures in the commercialisation of 
agriculture, rather than the inclusive growth imagined 
by CAADP. Poulton et al. (2014) ascribe this to the 
political incentives of national governments, which may 
not encourage them to align their agricultural policy to 
the advantage of smallholders, as CAADP proposes.
The narrative of ‘inclusive business models’ has played 
an important and increasing role in most of the study 
countries. Common forms are contract farming and 
outgrower schemes, where a larger company procures 
or processes crops produced by smaller-scale farmers 
and markets them in a way designed to bring mutual 
benefit (Glover, 1984; Little and Watts, 1994; Oya, 2013). 
They are often promoted as an equitable solution for 
local smallholder farmers in response to the new wave 
of large-scale land acquisitions and the evolution of 
business practices on already established commercial 
estates (Cotula and Leonard, 2010; Vermeulen and 
Cotula, 2010). The aim is to bring smaller farmers, 
marketers, processors and input suppliers into 
commercial agriculture in a way that makes profit 
for all parties, but which also achieves social goals, 
and avoids disadvantaging smaller actors. Risks and 
benefits are supposed to be shared among the central/
larger and peripheral/smaller actors, and smaller 
actors generally are supposed to have some influence 
over decision-making processes and retain access to, 
or ownership of, resources such as land (Vermeulen 
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and Cotula, 2010). Attention to equity, including gender 
equity, within the smaller enterprises is an important 
aspect (Daley and Park, 2012). However, there have 
been many critiques of their operation in practice, 
including land and labour relations, poor infrastructure, 
marginalisation of women farmers and less favourable 
outcomes for women, and problems of access to 
inputs, credit, and extension services (Tsikata, 2009; 
UNDP, 2010; Tsikata and Yaro, 2014; Sulle and Dancer, 
2020), as well as a lack of attention to power relations 
and the internal practices of MNCs (Halme, Lindeman 
and Linna, 2012).
1.2 Policy responses to COVID-19
Policy responses to the COVID-19 pandemic have 
affected people and agricultural value chains around 
the world. Asian government export bans of important 
staples, including rice and wheat, increased global food 
insecurity, particularly for African importing countries 
(Sulser and Dunston, 2020). Across Africa, internal and 
cross-border movement of people and goods was also 
restricted, influencing labour, input, and export markets 
in the short and medium term. Governments have 
cushioned the blows of COVID-19 for various groups, 
to varying extents. An initial focus was on consumers’ 
food security, with relief food packages disbursed 
to some urban areas in the immediate lockdowns in 
some countries, including Ghana and Zimbabwe. 
Some governments introduced stimulus packages for 
small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), including 
agricultural processors and traders. For example, 
in Ethiopia, the low availability of rice prompted the 
government to redouble attempts to encourage rice 
production (Alemu and Asaye, 2021). 
In APRA countries, the movement restrictions and 
economic policies enacted as a response to COVID-19 
in the first year of the pandemic had a more widespread 
effect on agricultural value chain actors than the 
disease itself (Devereux, Béné and Hoddinott, 2020), 
and disproportionately affected less powerful actors. 
Constraints on the movement of people and goods due 
to lockdowns and border restrictions created the most 
immediate disruption for actors involved in the value 
chains studied. This has also created considerable 
resistance in some contexts: 
In Malawi, the government intended to implement 
a national lockdown in response to the first wave of 
COVID-19 but was blocked by a court case which 
claimed the lockdown would put livelihoods of 
informal traders at risk (Masina, 2020).  Under a new 
president, the second and third waves of the disease 
were met with social distancing restrictions, curfews 
and other measures such as school closures, rather 
than full lockdowns.
Zimbabwe implemented lockdowns in response to the 
first, second and third waves of the virus, including 
curfews, closures of public facilities such as schools, 
and intercity travel bans, and reductions in workforces 
on site. Stricter measures were implemented in harder-
hit areas, and in the third wave, more lenient measures 
were adopted in areas where vaccination rates were 
highest (IMF, 2021; newsdzezimbabwe, 2021).
Ethiopia declared a state of emergency which involved 
banning inter-regional travel and requiring social 
distancing between April and September 2020. The 
COVID-19 Multi-Sectoral Preparedness and Response 
Plan included emergency food distribution to vulnerable 
individuals and tax breaks (IMF, 2021).
Ghana implemented social and border restrictions, 
including limits on the number of people allowed to 
gather, closure of educational facilities and restrictions 
on catering services. There was fuller lockdown in 
major urban areas, including stay-at-home orders 
and a ban on traffic in and out of three major cities. 
This was lifted after four weeks, with impacts on the 
poor being one reason. Wider social distancing was 
slowly relaxed from June 2020. Some measures were 
reintroduced between January and June 2021. In 
2021, the government introduced new taxes and levies 
on basic utilities to pay back for spending (IMF, 2021). 
Nigeria was particularly hard hit by COVID-19. A full 
lockdown was implemented from March 2020, which 
was gently lifted from May but reimposed in the 
second wave between December 2020 and January 
2021. Nigeria expanded its social register in response 
to COVID-19, enlarging the pool of people eligible for 
government support (IMF, 2021). 
Tanzania was an exception in that it did not implement 
a strict lockdown. Large gatherings were banned, 
but by June all restrictions had been lifted. Data on 
COVID-19 were no longer shared after April 2020, and 
President Magufuli declared the country to be COVID-
19-free. After a change of president in March 2021, the 
government changed its approach, publishing data in 
July 2021 and signing up to the Covax programme, 
but at that time no restrictions on activities had been 
implemented (Mwai, 2021).
In the medium to long term, flows of aid may be altered 
in less predictable ways. Some developed countries, 
including the United Kingdom, that have racked up huge 
debts from dealing with the crises at home are seeking 
to reduce their aid budgets, although simultaneously 
some debt repayments, for example to the IMF, have 
been paused. These policies, which are also driven by 
political priorities, confer relative advantage on different 
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groups and contribute to patterns and structures that 
shape social differentiation.
1.3 Analytical framework
In examining extant political-economic configurations, 
it is important to understand how powerful actors 
come to agreements about how to share the 
benefits of economic processes such as agricultural 
commercialisation, but also to understand how 
non-elite actors may act within the context of these 
agreements, to influence how those processes play 
out for them. Political settlement frameworks analyse 
these dynamics and the organisation and exercise of 
power between elites: they bring attention to ‘the formal 
and informal processes, agreements, and practices 
that help consolidate politics, rather than violence, as a 
means for dealing with disagreements about interests, 
ideas and the distribution and use of power’ (Laws, 
2012; Laws and Leftwich, 2014, p. 1; Kelsall, 2016; 
Khan, 2018). These analyses pose that the political 
settlements reached create situations that advantage 
some actors to the detriment of others, and that who 
are the winners and losers therefore depends heavily on 
local contexts and political alliances between local and 
national elites and international capital. Simultaneously, 
critiques of political settlements research frameworks 
have pointed to the focus on elites and public sphere 
dynamics, arguing that this does not provide space 
for recognition of the agency of non-elite and the 
associated actor-level effects, particularly in private 
spheres and wider social movements (O’Rourke, 
2017). O’Rourke’s feminist critique shows that political 
settlements approaches typically do not consider 
gender dimensions, such as ‘homosociality’ in intra-
elite and clientelist relationships and the effects of intra-
household gender dynamics on women’s access to 
markets and public services. However, wider literature 
on gender, social differentiation and agrarian change 
can provide the necessary insights to deepen political 
settlements analyses in this direction.
It is well established within literature on agrarian change 
in Africa that agricultural commercialisation is not a new 
phenomenon, but part of dynamic processes of political 
and social change in which smallholders and larger-
scale actors have been involved for centuries. These 
processes of agrarian change have long underlined 
existing contours of social differentiation, shaped by 
politics (Berry, 1993; Agarwal, 1994; Razavi, 2003; 
Manji, 2006; Lund, 2008; Bernstein, 2010; Boone, 2014; 
Hall, Scoones and Tskikata,  2015). Hall, Scoones and 
Tsikata, amongst others, resist the narrative of investor 
impacts on local peoples as either ‘passive beneficiaries 
of development’ or ‘victims of dispossession’. Instead, 
they argue that studies show more complex patterns of 
resistance and collaboration from local people ‘in ways 
that advance their diverse interests and that subvert 
investors’ plans’ (Hall, Scoones and Tskikata, 2015, p. 
24). They argue that the key question is ‘how new forms 
of capital, crops, production systems, labour regimes 
and expertise become inserted into – or resisted by 
– existing political-economic configurations, and in 
turn how this affects agrarian structures and patterns 
of social differentiation, and with what distributional 
consequences’ (Hall, Scoones and Tskikata, 2015, p. 
28).
In this paper, we draw on the literature on political 
settlements, while bringing attention to structures, 
politics and institutional dynamics that produce 
patterns of marginalisation, exclusion, and social 
differentiation. In doing so, we note O’Rourke’s critique 
of the gender blindness in political settlements literature 
and the need to investigate inter-elite interactions as 
‘homosocial’ relations. We also extend it to analyse 
social differentiation more broadly. Here we consider the 
work of Berry (1993), who argues nothing is given, and 
trajectories of change are complex, context-specific, 
contingent and dynamic, affected by agency at the 
individual and household scale as well as macropolitical 
and historical processes. Therefore, we recognise that, 
while processes of change are situated within wider 
structures and mechanisms that delimit the boundaries 
of negotiability for different social groups (Peters, 2004; 
2013), the agency of individual actors and gendered 
intra-household dynamics also play a key role in 
agrarian change (Boserup, 1970). Rather than seeking 
to identify rules or universal trends, we look at different 
processes of change across time and space, while 
highlighting patterns of social differentiation that appear 
to be common across contexts.
The most significant marker of social difference in 
processes of agricultural commercialisation across the 
six APRA countries is the distinction between small-
scale and large-scale producers, with the smaller-
scale operators much less able to deal with shocks. 
These smaller-scale actors may be farmers operating 
on a smaller hectarage, or marketing or processing 
businesses dealing with a smaller turnover of goods, or 
with few or no employees. Some structures have been 
identified which advantage larger scale actors, for 
example tariffs, tax breaks and administrative burdens 
that they are more able to bear. But who is more likely 
to be a small-scale farmer? We have hinted at this 
above and focus in this paper on facets of identity that 
appear most significant in the six countries studied: 
gender and kinship status, ethnicity and migrancy/
local citizenship, and class/wealth status. Age is also 
a factor but did not appear to be as significant as 
other factors in most of the countries studied. Where 
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this was mentioned in the country studies, it was 
mostly in the context of generational access to land 
and labour patterns. While it is useful to analyse the 
significance of each of these factors separately, to 
understand the social and political-economic drivers 
and consequences of commercialisation processes 
in practice, it is essential to consider the complexity 
of interactions between them. Different aspects of 
individual social identity overlap, sometimes to create 
intersectional disadvantage (Crenshaw, 1989). We find 
that each of these intersecting facets of identity underlie 
the nature of people’s engagement in agricultural value 
chains, both in terms of their occupation and social 
and political capital in the value chain, and the degree 
of management and control they may have over 
agricultural land, and whether they are or may become 
smallholder or large-scale farmers.
Lastly, the concept of ‘resilience’ is useful for analysing 
how people and systems respond to shocks such 
as COVID-19 (Béné et al., 2012; Béné, 2020). Some 
studies use the concept to analyse resilience of the food 
system (Tendall et al., 2015). The concept can also refer 
to resilience resulting from an actor’s set of capacities 
or abilities (Béné, 2020, pp. 809—10). This second 
approach characterises resilience to shocks in relation 
to an actor’s access to social, human, and financial 
capital, and the strategies they employ to reduce the 
risk of negative outcomes and increase their resilience 
capacity. This may include selling assets, borrowing, 
or reducing household food consumption; or quickly 
adapting by, for example, shifting to other input 
suppliers and sources of labour; or pursuing alternative 
livelihood opportunities (Béné 2020, pp. 809—10). The 
ways that actors respond to shocks such as COVID-19 
are not only shaped by individual agency and access 
to resources, but also by their pre-existing status in 
political and socio-economic systems. 
1.4 Data collection and overview of the 
value chain studies
This paper draws on data collected for nine others, 
which cover the 11 value chains listed in Table 2.1. 
The authors of each country study drew on qualitative 
interviews with value chain actors as well as literature 
and media review. Table 2.1 summarises the value 
chains examined in each source paper, and the 
methods used by the authors.
1.5 Structure of the paper
The next section analyses how state control, 
liberalisation and political settlements in the countries 
studied have shaped agricultural value chains and 
policy responses to COVID-19. We consider firstly, 
the extent of liberalisation or state control and the 
political settlements these entail; and secondly, how 
governmental and non-governmental actors affect 
social differentiation through marketing strategies, 
import controls, price-fixing, collective action, and 
trading systems in agricultural value chains. Section 
3 examines how local actors in the value chains 
studied have responded to COVID-19, and how their 
responses are shaped by access to critical resources 
including land, labour, credit/capital, inputs, as well as 
other livelihood opportunities. These in turn contribute 
to patterns of social differentiation. 
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Crop Overview of the value chain Methodological notes
‘value chain actors’ includes farmers, 
processors, wholesalers, retailers, and credit 
and other input providers etc.
Ghana (Asante, 
2021)
Palm oil Bifurcated value chain with women 
mainly processing and carrying 
out small-scale production for 
local markets; some larger-scale 
production for international markets 
by men.
Literature review. Twelve key informant interviews 
with government, donor and value chain 
actors. Twelve telephone interviews as part of a 
rapid market survey to understand impacts of 
COVID-19.
Ghana (Teye and 
Nikoi, 2021)
Cocoa An important export crop 
concentrated in the southern part 
of the country.
Literature review. Twenty-one key informant 
interviews with government and value chain 




Cocoa A less successful export crop 
concentrated in the southern part 
of the country.
Systematic review. Sixteen interviews with 





Maize Important food crop; 
modernisation of sector underway.
Literature review. Value Chain Mapping. Eighteen 
Interviews with eight groups of actors in Kaduna 
and Plateau states. 
Zimbabwe 
(Shonhe, 2021)
Maize An important national food crop; 
strongly state-controlled sector.
Documentary analysis. Twelve key informant 
interviews in Harare with industry and 
government stakeholders. Two focus group 
discussions with each of three types of farmer in 
Mvurwi, Mashonaland Central Province, 100km 
north-west of Harare. 
Zimbabwe 
(Shonhe, 2021)
Tobacco An important crop for national 
income; liberalised market which 
was affected by sanctions.
As Shonhe (2021) above.
Malawi (Chinsinga 
and Matita, 2021)
Groundnut The most important legume crop in 
the country; fluctuating production 
and export levels. 
Literature review. Twenty-three interviews with 
government, industry, development, policy and 




Sunflower National food crop growing in 
importance; unable to compete on 
international markets due to high 
price.
Literature review. Over 30 interviews with 




Rice Important for national consumption 
and export.
Literature review. Two sets of key informant 
interviews with the same 24 respondents from 
the government and rice value chain. A rapid 




Rice Important food crop increasing in 
popularity; local grown varieties 
cannot compete with imported 
basmati.
Secondary literature review. Twenty key 
informant interviews with government and 
industry actors. Four focus group discussions 
with value chain actors.
Nigeria (Aiyede, 
2021)
Rice Important food crop where 
smallholders are increasingly 
supported within contract farming; 
government controls imports to 
protect sector.
As Aiyede (2021) above.
Source: Authors’ own
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2.1 State control, liberalisation and 
political settlements
Many of the effects of COVID-19 are the consequence 
of immediate policy responses to the disease. Yet, 
longer-term policy approaches of liberalisation and 
state control have shaped the agricultural sector in 
ways that result in differential impacts of short-term 
shocks on different actors. From the 1980s, SAPs 
encouraged full liberalisation of African agricultural 
markets. In the 21st century, the idea promoted by the 
African Union’s CAADP and international development 
partners is that governments should not be entirely 
hands-off but shape agricultural markets in such a 
way that the private sector can take over almost all 
functions, including support to farmers. For example, 
the private sector is encouraged to partner with 
government in the provision of subsidies to farmers. 
Simultaneously, there is an understanding that 
state support and public investment is needed for 
private sector activity to develop, and for successful 
smallholder commercialisation which reduces poverty 
(Mellor, 2014).
According to political settlements analysis, structures 
of resource access and control are shaped by 
given institutions, reinforcing intra-elite and some 
elite-non-elite relations, while disadvantaging other 
groups (Laws, 2012). If there is a risk of conflict 
between groups, and especially between groups and 
government, a government will be inclined to enter a 
settlement to make things more amenable for them, for 
example by changing policy in their favour (Laws and 
Leftwich, 2014). For example, governments seeking 
farmers’ votes may decide to implement subsidies. 
Settlements between elites may be to distribute rents 
between them (Kelsall, 2016). There may also be formal 
or informal arrangements, and the actors concerned 
are not necessarily elites.
Ideas of political settlement suggest that actors 
within agricultural value chains, including international 
actors, have the power to manipulate markets to the 
advantage of certain groups, practices, and modes 
of commercialisation. Some kind of settlement with 
government is necessary to make this happen. It is 
largely perceived that governmental manipulation of 
markets takes place when governments retain a large 
amount of control over the market, for example by fixing 
prices and controlling imports and exports. However, 
policy support is also needed for the type of liberalisation 
enacted in the study countries, creating a preferential 
climate for investment. Apart from Zimbabwe, the APRA 
countries have moved towards liberalisation to varying 
degrees, although many have retained elements of state 
control in many value chains. Moreover, the transition 
from one-party state to multi-party democracy changes 
political settlements, but also maintains opportunities 
for clientelism and patronage as drivers of policy and 
rents, as in Malawi (Chinsinga and Matita, 2021).
One of the most important domains in which this 
has happened is land. Policy determines whether 
land markets can be established, which is one of 
the key facilitating factors for large- and medium-
scale agricultural investment, especially for non-
autochthon farmers. Making access to land possible 
is an important way that governments can reach 
political bargains with large-scale private actors and 
development partners who espouse the ideology of 
free land markets. Examples include federal land banks 
for foreign direct investment in Ethiopia, investment 
promotion centres and special land courts in Ghana, 
and a series of policy programmes in Tanzania geared 
towards attracting large-scale investment in the rice and 
sugarcane sectors, including the Southern Agricultural 
Growth Corridor of Tanzania and Big Results Now (Hall, 
Scoones and Tsikata, 2015).
There are several opportunities to create political 
settlements with large importers and capitalists 
through the distribution of movable inputs, notably 
fertiliser. In some contexts, governments may use 
political discretion and cronyism to grant favourable 
tariffs and tax subsidies to large importers or 
capitalists who provide such inputs. For example, in 
the Ghanaian cocoa value chain, the fertiliser subsidy 
policy has created rents for contracts for supplying 
subsidised inputs, some of which have reportedly 
never materialised (Teye and Nikoi, 2021). Such tactics 
are easy to implement in the era of liberalisation, as 
the involvement of private sector actors in the fertiliser 
distribution is welcomed – although the subsidisation 
of such inputs is more contentious.
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Governments also use subsidies to cushion producers 
from the more difficult aspects of operating in entirely 
liberalised markets, while seeking their political 
support. Such measures are controversial for 
distorting market impulses for farmers. Short-term 
support policies such as favourable input subsidies 
are frequently introduced when politically expedient. 
In the Nigerian cocoa value chain, they have played a 
role in patronage for cocoa farmers when politicians 
sympathetic to them are in power (Aiyede, 2021). 
In both the Ghanaian and Nigerian cocoa sectors, 
governments have created incentives such as input 
subsidies, training and technical assistance, access to 
finance and promoting access to export markets for 
certain farmers. In the Ghanaian palm oil sector, the 
government also provides technical and extension 
services to smallholders (Asante, 2021). In the Nigerian 
rice and maize sectors, federal and state governments 
provide loans and subsidised inputs to producers to 
increase production towards self-sufficiency in rice 
(Aiyede, 2021; Amaza, Mailumo and Silong, 2021). 
In Tanzania, the National Agricultural Input Voucher 
Scheme 2008 has coincided with election years (Mdoe 
and Mlay, 2021). Malawi implemented a Farm Input 
Subsidy Programme between 2005 and 2020 aimed 
at crop diversification, including groundnuts. However, 
the scheme was largely unsuccessful, in part due to the 
emotive issue of maize security at the heart of Malawi’s 
political economy, leading to policies that have tended 
towards reactivity and rent seeking (World Bank, 2018; 
Chinsinga and Matita, 2021).
A more long-term strategy in liberalised development 
approaches is to support farmers through development 
and distribution of improved technology, which 
has shown varying and partial degrees of success. 
Technological improvement is a common discourse in 
donor-driven commercialisation agendas, particularly 
in relation to distribution of improved seeds. In Tanzania, 
government, development organisations and the 
private sector have tried to promote high quality seed to 
allow smallholders to perform better in export and local 
markets (Isinika and Jeckoniah, 2021; Mdoe and Mlay, 
2021). In more highly regulated markets, marketing 
boards and associated structures have taken on these 
roles, for example in the Ghanaian cocoa value chain, 
where there is a long history of cultivar development 
alongside input support and subsidy (Teye and Nikoi, 
2021). In Ethiopia, there has been heavy investment 
into rice research to try to tackle the shortage of home-
grown long grain rice, with little success so far (Alemu 
and Assaye, 2021). In Malawi, donors such as USAID 
and Irish Aid have invested in improving farmers’ 
access to varieties of groundnut seed that are suitable 
for global export markets. However, many of these 
seed varieties have yet to be released to farmers due 
to financial constraints, meaning that they continue to 
cultivate seed that is susceptible to disease, with limited 
potential for export (Chinsinga and Matita, 2021).
The presence of a crop or marketing board is 
connected to how liberalised or otherwise a sector is. 
The board generally acts as an institution through which 
government controls aspects such as technology 
development and subsidy. In Zimbabwe, the Grain 
Marketing Board (GMB) enjoys a pervasive monopoly 
over the grain industry, while the Tobacco Industry 
Marketing Board and Tobacco Research Board control 
contract farming and seed production (Shonhe, 2021). 
By contrast, in Ethiopia and Tanzania, there is no 
formal governing body for the rice sector, meaning 
that political power over the sector is somewhat less 
concentrated than in other contexts. In some places, 
marketing boards may remain, but retain less political 
control. In Ghana, the state has retained control over 
the cocoa sector through the Ghana Cocoa Board 
and its subsidiary marketing body, rejecting the push 
towards full liberalisation from development partners. 
In Malawi, SAPs precipitated the collapse of the 
Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation 
(ADMARC), which had hitherto provided farmers with 
inputs, access to markets and guaranteed prices for 
produce. This was to the detriment of smallholders, 
who became reliant on often exploitative vendors and 
agro-dealers who operate in the more accessible parts 
of the country to the neglect of the remotest areas 
(Chinsinga and Matita, 2021).
2.2 Marketing, import controls and 
price-fixing
A central function of marketing boards has been 
controlling prices, tariffs, and taxes. In countries 
where governments retain control of markets, they 
may fix prices through marketing boards, but can 
also construct markets by implementing tariffs, bans 
and quotas. Staple crops are politically important and 
policies including export bans and commodity price 
changes have been used to solicit smallholder and 
consumer support during election periods. In Tanzania 
export bans on rice have coincided with election years 
since the 1960s (Mdoe and Mlay, 2021). Such policies 
are often temporary and designed to procure political 
support rather than long-term solutions to structural 
inequalities in the sector. Import restrictions are another 
way government can control markets, and they can 
use this to advantage different groups of producers. 
Larger national and international companies in Nigeria 
have been helped by long-term rice import restrictions 
and government incentives for importers to invest in 
domestic production (Aiyede, 2021). In Tanzania larger 
companies benefited when they were made eligible for 
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tariff exemptions, which reduced consumer prices to 
the benefit of urban populations but did not protect 
smallholder farmers from cheap imports (Mdoe and 
Mlay, 2021).
The extent of liberalisation may vary between value 
chains in a given country, possibly dependent on the 
settlement a government reaches with external actors. 
In the Zimbabwe tobacco sector, the post 2009 
Government of National Unity liberalised marketing in 
the sector, with seven out of the 36 tobacco merchants 
of foreign origin. Marketing power is concentrated in 
the hands of just five MNCs who control 80 per cent 
of the industry. By contrast, in the Zimbabwe maize 
sector the state has monopoly military control through 
the reintroduction of Command Agriculture in 2006 
and the GMB has monopoly over the buying and 
selling of grain. In 2020, GMB was selling to millers at 
subsidised prices, though not all millers benefitted. The 
Grain Millers Association of Zimbabwe moderates the 
supply of maize to millers and has been accused of 
patronage and corruption. In both sectors, resettled 
peasant farmers (A1) and resettled large-scale capitalist 
farmers (A2) have secured the greatest advantage in 
terms of accumulation of assets and access to higher 
commodity prices in US dollars via informal sellers 
(makoronyera), rather than the Zimbabwean Dollars 
that communal area (CA) peasant farmers receive 
through being obliged to sell their maize through the 
GMB (Shonhe, 2021).
Increased export bureaucracy, such as requirements 
for licences, is difficult for and unpopular with traders. 
In the Tanzanian rice value chain, governments have 
exempted specific export firms from the ban, to gain 
favour not only with them but also with consumers 
as prices fall (Mdoe and Mlay, 2021). This price 
instability has unintended effects on other marketers, 
which encourages an illegal market. In the Tanzanian 
sunflower market, larger-scale producers have received 
Value Added Tax (VAT) discounts. Simultaneously, 
high tariffs and taxes disproportionately discourage 
smallholders because they cause the farm gate 
price to drop to a level which is unprofitable for them 
(Isinika and Jeckoniah, 2021). The combination of this 
results in clear advantage for the larger producers. 
In the country’s rice sector, the government has also 
granted duty free rice import permits to large importers 
with political connections. Negative effects of price 
fixing and import controls, as well as negative donor 
reactions, explain why some governments have not 
extensively fixed imports and exports, but focused 
on raising production instead. For example, demand 
for long grain rice in Ethiopia, where farmers tend to 
produce short grain varieties, means banning long-
grain imports is unrealistic (Alemu and Assaye, 2021).
When exercised in a short-term fashion, these types 
of initiatives serve only to temporarily favour groups 
when it is politically expedient. When they are used 
over the long term, they can support in a different way. 
In Nigeria, rice imports have been banned over the 
longer term, and this has helped larger national and 
international companies make longer-term investments 
in production and processing, which was too risky 
previously as they could not compete with the prices of 
imports (Aiyede, 2021). Ghana’s cocoa marketing board 
controls the price of cocoa, keeping it below world 
prices but also steady, while continuing to subsidise 
inputs and contributing to maintaining a place for 
Ghanaian cocoa in world markets by trying to maintain 
its quality through research and extension (Teye and 
Nikoi, 2021). Malawi currently uses export bans to 
regulate exports of commodities, including maize and 
legumes; but the longer-term proposal is to introduce 
export mandates as a more proactive response to the 
effects of declining tobacco exports. This could have 
a positive impact in terms of increasing formal trade, 
and therefore tax revenues, as well as improve farmers’ 
incomes; but in the context of Malawi’s political 
settlement, there are suspicions among stakeholders 
as to how export mandates will be operationalised, 
and the potential for collusion between government 
officials and owners of commodity exchange platforms 
(Chinsinga and Matita, 2021). Reflecting on O’Rourke’s 
(2017) critique of political settlements, it is important 
to observe here that homosociality across these intra-
elite and clientelist relationships serves to procure 
political support that is also strongly gendered.
2.3 Non-governmental actors: 
development partners, farmers’ 
associations, illegal and informal 
traders
Development partners have a strong influence on 
market functioning, especially historically in the SAP 
era and currently in the context of liberalised markets 
and the drives to make commercialisation work 
better for women and young people. Lately, public-
private partnerships aimed at youth and women’s 
empowerment and poverty reduction have been 
prominent aspects of policy and programming. In 
the Ghanaian cocoa value chain, where 80 per cent 
of producers are smallholders, low cocoa prices have 
contributed to keeping many farmers in poverty. MNCs 
have also used their influence within the sector to push 
certification standards such as Fairtrade which raise 
prices and provide better incomes to these farmers, as 
well as providing the companies with a market niche 
(Barrientos et al., 2008; Teye and Nikoi, 2021).
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Farmers’ groups have varying influences – they are 
cited as being weak in Tanzania (Isinika and Jeckoniah, 
2021), but those in Nigeria managed to encourage the 
government to close the borders to maize imports to 
protect maize farmers (Amaza, Mailumo and Silong, 
2021). Trades unions also exert power and influence 
over who benefits from agricultural policies. The 
Ghana Union of Traders’ Associations has a strong 
membership base, and in the palm oil sector the 
government has avoided introducing policies that the 
union does not support to avoid electoral backlash 
(Asante, 2021). This can lead to support for smaller-
scale actors when they are well represented by such 
organisations. At a more local level, participation in 
farmers’ associations has been critical for smallholders 
in the Malawian groundnut sector, as a form of social 
capital, knowledge, and support, as well as leading to 
other tangible benefits for production (Chinsinga and 
Matita, 2021).
In many value chains, most local marketing does not 
travel through marketing boards and could be labelled 
‘informal’. This provides a more advantageous market 
route for some people, while potentially undermining 
states. Illegal marketing – that is, smuggling – 
advantages those who cannot use government 
policies profitably, but also powerful individuals who 
may be involved. In Zimbabwe, the makoronyera have 
been a powerful disruptive influence on monopoly 
state control and cross-border illicit trade, blurring any 
distinction between formal and informal in value chain 
structures and the political system. They can front US 
dollars for farm produce such as maize and tobacco, 
even though marketing boards simultaneously exist 
(Shonhe, 2021). Unlike the Grain Millers’ Association 
of Zimbabwe, they pay a better rate in US dollars at 
the farm gate, but only self-financed and contract 
farmers can take advantage of this. Both makoronyera 
and MNCs extract surplus value through illicit trade, 
which is exported to the detriment of farmers and the 
Zimbabwean national economy, while advantaging 
‘untouchable’ (male) political elites (Hayson, 2019; 
Shonhe, 2021).
Informal trading practices are not only important 
for providing routes to market for people who are 
disadvantaged in official routes, but also when the 
official routes aim to extract heavily from the farmers, for 
example in the early stages of the Ghanaian cocoa value 
chain. In some countries, for example Malawi, informal 
export markets have become important sources for 
regional trade where crops are considered unsuitable 
for global markets and predictable markets have 
disappeared. Many of the traders in Malawi’s informal 
groundnut export market are Burundian migrants, who 
work on commission to other marketers in Lilongwe or 
their villages and provide loans to farmers on the basis 
that their produce will be sold to them. The market 
relies heavily on social connections and the ability to 
speak Burundian languages, to the exclusion of most 
Malawians (Chinsinga and Matita, 2021). 
This discussion has shown that it is a political choice 
to support farmers and other actors at a given scale 
in agricultural value chains. As O’Rourke (2017) 
notes, such political choices that involve intra-elite 
and clientelist relationships between men also serve 
to structurally exclude women, non-elites and wider 
social movements. This maleness in elite bargaining, 
political corruption and blurring of boundaries between 
public and private actors through illicit trade networks 
(Zimbabwe’s makoronyera and tobacco MNCs linked 
to political elites being the clearest example) highlights 
the importance of questioning the gendered nature 
of political settlements themselves. Furthermore, a 
political settlements analysis of agricultural value chains 
also needs to take account of how the homosociality 
of the relationships described in this section and 
their policy implications affect intrahousehold power 
dynamics and shape social differentiation. The next 
section explores how these political settlements, value 
chain and wider social structures continually shape 
farmers’, processors’, distributors’ and marketers’ 
access to various resources and opportunities. It also 
considers the capacity of actors to make decisions 
about their livelihood trajectories within these structures 
and patterns of social differentiation.
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The ways people are affected by shocks such as 
COVID-19, and their resilience capacities to deal 
with shocks are significantly shaped by the wider 
structures and political settlements discussed above, 
as well as long-term patterns of social differentiation. 
This section draws upon the findings from the APRA 
country studies to analyse how the effects of the 
COVID-19 shock have overlaid entrenched and 
emergent patterns of social differentiation for those 
involved in commercial agriculture.
3.1 Access to land
The nature of people’s interest in agricultural land 
remains the most significant determinant of how 
they participate in agriculture. Access to land and 
tenure security also contribute to patterns of social 
differentiation. Land access and tenure are strongly 
affected by the longer-term political settlements and 
processes of liberalisation described in Section 2. 
While land dynamics interacted less directly with the 
COVID-19 shock, access to land had knock-on labour 
consequences for both landholders and the landless in 
agricultural value chains.
Access to land is shaped by historical and 
contemporary politics of land reform, as well as social 
norms and processes of land tenure (Berry, 1993; 
Agarwal, 1994; Razavi, 2003; Manji, 2006; Lund, 
2008; Bernstein, 2010; Boone, 2014; Hall, Scoones 
and Tsikata, 2015). In several of the APRA countries, 
the legacy of colonialism has left patterns of customary 
land tenure among smallholder farmers where power 
is vested in traditional authorities, family lineages 
and household heads, or village governments, often 
as a matter of political expediency. For example, in 
Ghana since the 1990s traditional leaders have been 
custodians of customary land tenure and important 
actors in land markets due to the informal government 
‘policy of non-interference’ (Ubink, 2008). However, 
where land is becoming commoditised, leases and 
share contracts are increasingly common, weakening 
kinship-based ties to the land, including women’s 
usufruct interests (Tsikata and Yaro, 2014). In many 
of the APRA countries, traditional and communal 
systems operate alongside private property, although 
this happens in very different ways. In Nigeria and 
Ghana, multiple systems of communal or traditional 
ownership are recognised alongside a shift towards 
private property and commodification, facilitated by 
state administration. 
Smallholder tenure is the main form of landholding 
across all the APRA countries and much land is held 
under customary tenure. For example, in Ghana, the 
800,000 smallholder farmer households cultivate land 
sizes up to five hectares. Eighty per cent have control 
rights over the land they farm, while 20 per cent depend 
on sharecropping (Teye and Nikoi, 2021). Although 
traditional systems allow smallholders usufruct rights to 
land, increasingly, family heads and traditional leaders 
stand to benefit from transfers of land rights on a 
market, and may therefore encourage the development 
of such markets, often to the detriment of smallholders 
or traditional rights holders, especially in peri-urban 
zones (Nchanji, 2018). Land policy has had to recognise 
these various systems while responding to pressures 
to liberalise land markets. In Ghana, government 
policies now aim towards both large-scale commercial 
farming and nucleus-outgrower schemes (Schoneveld, 
2013). The World Bank is strongly supporting efforts 
to fully bureaucratise the Ghanaian land administration 
system, reflecting continent-wide trends towards the 
liberalisation of land markets (Jayne, Chamberlin and 
Headey, 2014).
In recent decades, several of the APRA countries, 
including Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Tanzania, have turned 
towards liberalisation of the land sector with the aim 
of creating a favourable climate for investment. Within 
these more liberalised land markets, countries have 
promoted large-scale agriculture by granting land 
concessions to large companies, for example the Plan 
for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End 
Poverty 2005—2010 in Ethiopia, where land was leased 
to Saudi and India-based conglomerates. These large-
scale land acquisitions in Ethiopia have been criticised 
for failing to provide opportunities for existing farmers 
or even in some cases to become operational at all 
(Alemu and Thompson,2020). In Tanzania, power over 
large-scale land investment policy for agriculture in 
Tanzania remains centralised, while village authorities 
retain responsibility for local level land administration. 
Policies including the Agricultural Sector Development 
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Programme, Kilimo Kwanza (Agriculture First) and the 
National Rice Development Strategy have promoted 
both large-scale and smallholder commercial 
agriculture, including collective rice irrigation and 
marketing schemes to double land planted with rice by 
2030 (Mdoe and Mlay, 2021). 
The Zimbabwean state is the one in our sample which 
has retained significant control over land tenure through 
its Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) 
2000, which bucked the trend towards large-scale 
agriculture seen in other countries. The programme 
created a trimodal land tenure system of small-scale 
A1 farmers, medium-scale A2 farmers and CA farmers, 
dispossessing former white commercial farmers in 
favour of these other farmers in the process. This policy 
is directly linked to intra-party politics of Zanu PF and 
inter-party politics (Scoones et al., 2010). There have 
been knock-on effects on other elements: European 
Union markets closed to Zimbabwean tobacco. Land 
redistribution has resulted in reduced labour supplies, 
as more smallholders own and work on their land 
(Moyo, 2011; Chambati, 2013).
Within these macro-structures of land access 
arrangements, individuals have turned to micro-level 
strategies to ensure access to land. Amanor, Yaro 
and Teye (2020) describe how this has happened 
in Ghana’s cocoa sector in ways that draw on the 
interaction between labour and land. Traditionally, 
young family members provided labour on land, 
in the understanding that they may be able to 
inherit it. During the independence era in Ghana, 
land and labour scarcities contributed to a rise in 
sharecropping and caretaker farming, providing 
migrants land access and farmers a source of funds 
for inputs, which sharecroppers were often obliged 
to provide. Sharecropping was often a way into land 
access and sometimes ownership, as sharecroppers 
accumulated profits to buy land in new markets. 
However, increasingly, the sharecroppers were family 
members, and more formalised family sharecropper 
relations have now been recorded, where family 
member sharecroppers expect to receive a specified 
portion of the land or crop. This arrangement is more 
favourable than migrant sharecropping and replaces 
the understanding of general familial reciprocity 
of labour and inheritance of land. There are also 
cases of daughters influencing mothers in matrilineal 
systems to re-allocate family lands for inheritance by 
daughters rather than sons, in order to retain lands 
within the lineage (Amanor, Yaro and Teye, 2020). 
Through such routes, lineage members have been 
able to manipulate processes of access to land and 
inheritance. The household or private sphere can 
therefore be as important as the macro-level political 
processes generally examined by political settlements 
analyses.
Contract farming and outgrowing provide or 
support access to land and processing facilities for 
smallholders, though the effects on peoples’ land 
tenure security are not the same for all schemes (Oya, 
2013). Nigeria’s nucleus farm model for rice production 
guarantees market access, capacity building and 
quality control, but farmers have limited control over 
decision-making and are contractually bound to the 
estate for the land that they farm. By comparison, 
Nigerian rice outgrowers cultivate their own land and 
repay for inputs at a preferential rate, while independent 
smallholders have greater autonomy but with access 
to lower quality inputs and reliance on government 
extension officers (Aiyede, 2021). In the Ghanaian 
palm oil sector, the situation is similar for independent 
smallholders, while under nucleus-outgrower schemes 
the estate has the right to take over a farm in the event 
of any contractual violations until loans have been fully 
repaid (Asante, 2021).
A rise in medium-scale farming is often more associated 
with wealthier entrants to farming than smallholder 
consolidation of land (Jayne, Chamberlin and Headey, 
2014; Muyanga et al., 2019). However, in Malawi both 
groups have acquired medium-scale landholdings (an 
estimated 54 per cent resulting from small-scale farmer 
accumulation, and 45 per cent from urban-based 
professionals) (Answeeuw et al., 2016). This has often 
been to the detriment of groups with weaker access to 
and control over land, particularly women and youth, 
creating barriers to their participation in the value chain 
(Chinsinga and Matita, 2021). When smaller-scale 
farmers or specific social groups lose access to fertile, 
irrigable land, they may end up labouring in addition to 
working on their own holdings (Mutabazi, Wiggins and 
Mdoe, 2013). This has been the case in Malawi, where 
women are reportedly facing displacement following 
the collapse of tobacco as a cash crop and men turning 
to groundnuts, that had hitherto been socially regarded 
as ‘a women’s crop’ (Chinsinga and Matita, 2021). 
Gender is a critical factor in terms of land-based 
social differentiation (Doss, Summerfield and Tsikata, 
2014; 2015; Dancer and Tsikata, 2015). Doss et al. 
(2015) point out that reliable data on gendered access 
to land are scarce and rarely nuanced enough to 
provide insight. Land may be held jointly, and access 
to and control over land is as relevant as ‘ownership’, 
however that is defined. Nevertheless, women 
generally have sole control over much less land 
than men do. Household headship and gendered 
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customary practices of land tenure are important 
factors here. While overall household productivity 
may be higher in marital households where men and 
women perform complementary productive roles, 
women who are household heads may have greater 
agency than married women in terms of their own 
participation in agriculture.
Overall, in the countries studied, women were in the 
minority of landowners. In Ghana, matrilineal and 
patrilineal systems of land tenure mean that only a small 
proportion of women smallholders have control over 
land in their own right, whether as household heads of 
members of a household. Similarly, largely patrilineal 
systems of customary land tenure in Tanzania make 
men the main inheritors of family land, and they have 
more power to purchase and have land allocated to 
them, while women are more likely to rent or purchase 
land. In Nigeria, women were half as likely as men to 
purchase land and twice as likely to rent it. Women’s 
plots were smaller and less than half a per cent were 
irrigated (Oxfam Nigeria, 2019; Aiyede, 2021). The 
bundle of rights associated with land tenure in turn 
affects management control and gendered divisions 
of labour over the land (Ribot and Peluso, 2003; 
Doss et al., 2015). Other gendered dynamics act not 
through individual land rights but through the effects of 
large-scale land acquisitions. Daley and Pallas (2014) 
show that large-scale land deals generally have more 
negative effects for women than men, because of their 
weaker tenure rights and reduced access to common 
property resources following such deals.
Differential access to land by gender is also shaped by 
political and value chain structures. A clear illustration 
of this is the Zimbabwean tobacco and maize sectors. 
While 25 per cent of A2 women farmers participate 
in Command Agriculture for maize production, none 
have access to contract farming. By contrast in the 
tobacco sector, 20.7 per cent of women farmers, 
not necessarily only as household heads, are 
involved in contract farming. This is because the 
financing structure in the tobacco sector makes it in 
the household’s interest for both spouses to enter 
into separate contracting arrangements with private 
tobacco firms to maximise the household’s overall 
access to finance (Shonhe, 2021). 
Chinsinga et al. (2021) have described how women 
have often been unable to secure access to land 
through inheritance in Malawi, despite attempting to 
draw on traditional and legal fora. Several cases were 
reported where a deceased man’s family members 
removed their kinsman’s widow and sometimes 
children from land. Women were usually unable to seek 
recourse through traditional systems, where traditional 
leaders were increasingly seen as corrupt in a context 
of deepening land markets and rent payments. Many 
women tried to take cases to district courts, perceiving 
these as more impartial. The high costs of these legal 
proceedings were reported to have impoverished 
women in several cases, without guaranteeing that 
they would regain access to land. The state of land law 
in Malawi also prolonged cases, as old land laws have 
been repealed without replacements being instituted.
Social differentiation in the management, control and 
use of land affects people’s relative abilities to react to 
shocks such as COVID-19. In some cases, exclusion 
from land control can reduce the ability of agricultural 
labourers to deal with shocks, in the sense that they 
have no other livelihood or subsistence option to turn 
to when income generation from labouring becomes 
impossible. Smallholders may also be less able to 
deal with shocks by taking actions such as stockpiling 
to take advantage of higher process later. These 
actions are not specifically because they hold a small 
amount of land, but because of the other low resource 
endowments associated with this. Those who 
benefit from smallholder schemes or outgrowing can 
sometimes avoid these types of effect if the nucleus 
company can cushion the shock. Large businesses 
equally experienced disruption and inability to trade 
in the COVID-19 pandemic but were sometimes more 
able to bear it because they had more capital. 
Overall, the data presented in the source papers 
on the theme of land provide evidence for a system 
where some parties are advantaged within different 
aspects of the architecture. For example, political 
settlements have favoured large companies who wish 
to acquire land, and men are generally favoured within 
traditional structures. Less advantaged actors, such 
as smallholders and women, attempt to negotiate their 
own access to land within these structures.
3.2 Access to labour
The organisation of labour varies across different types 
of commercial farming. Free nuclear and extended 
family labour as well as paid non-family labour are 
important to smallholders in all the value chains 
considered, including outgrowers and contract farmers, 
with sharecropping also especially prevalent in cocoa 
value chains. Associational labour also plays a small 
and diminishing role. Larger-scale agriculture, less 
well represented in our sample, relies more on wage 
labour, as may medium-scale farming. Feminisation 
of the labour force is a hallmark of commercialisation 
(Standing, 1989; Kabeer, 2003; Dunaway, 2014) and 
gendered labour is common in agricultural value chains 
(Dolan and Sorby, 2003). Some studies have shown 
that large-scale agriculture has a particularly negative 
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impact on labour patterns and wage inequalities 
(Sajhau and Von Muralt, 1987; Julia and White, 2012). 
However, the availability of relatively well-paid labouring 
opportunities on large estates and sometimes medium-
scale farms can also provide valuable job opportunities 
(Smalley, 2013; Hall, Scoones and Tsikata, 2017). Who 
benefits depends on how well the farm is integrated 
into a local economy.
Advantage is not automatically conferred to those 
traditionally tied to a given task set. The ownership 
of capital determines who can profit from the use of 
labour at various value chain stages. For example, in the 
APRA study countries, marketing and oil processing 
in West Africa are often the domains of women, while 
in Tanzania, women dominate rice production but are 
more excluded from the more lucrative processing 
(Mdoe and Mlay, 2021). In palm oil in Ghana and 
the maize value chain in Nigeria, although women 
dominate production, equipment is often owned by 
men (Asante, 2021; Amaza, Mailumo and Silong, 2021). 
The Ghanaian palm oil value chain illustrates how men 
may have more opportunity to process more lucrative 
high-quality oil, whereas women are predominantly in 
the artisanal sector processing oil with a lower market 
price. When women’s and men’s labour is unequally 
remunerated, male owners of land and processing 
equipment are often able to profit from this. In the 
Malawi groundnut sector, gender, class and migrancy 
intersect in terms of who benefits from technical 
innovations. Here, richer male Burundians have had 
the capital to invest in electric groundnut shelling 
machines, whereas most of the manual machines are 
owned by Malawians. All the machine operators are 
male, and those engaged in sieving and grading after 
shelling are women (Chinsinga and Matita, 2021).
The form of commercial agriculture that labourers 
participate in matters for social differentiation. In the 
study countries, labour relations tend to be organised 
in ways that disadvantage poorer farmers and 
those who own less, or no, land and other capital. 
In Tanzania, these farmers often end up selling their 
own labour at the start of the season to purchase 
other inputs, and so sow late, disadvantaging them 
and widening the gap between them and their more 
advantaged peers. In recent years, this has been 
exacerbated by the increased use of oxen, expanding 
cultivated areas, and raising competition for land 
and labour (Isinika and Jeckoniah, 2021). In the rice 
value chain in Ethiopia’s Fogera plain, labour is mostly 
provided by rural youth without access to their own 
land (Alemu and Assaye, 2021). 
When farmers have an opportunity to become 
contract farmers, this can mediate the dynamics. 
Contract farming arrangements in Zimbabwe may 
occasionally support the contract farmer with labour 
costs, reproducing any advantage that enabled them 
to become contract farmers initially (Moyo, 2011; 
Shonhe, 2021). Hence, some complain that input 
schemes without such a facility are less useful for 
tackling social differentiation, with the landholdings 
and incomes of women contract farmers being less 
than men, whether they are household heads or not. 
Evidence from Zimbabwe also shows that the form of 
the value chain matters. Chambati (2013) describes 
how tobacco farmers and contract farmers tend to 
receive higher wages, more often on time, than others. 
However, the transition from labourer to farm owner 
remains harder for women and non-autochthons. 
Women may be disadvantaged in customary land 
tenure systems where they stand not to inherit any of 
their husband’s land they may have worked on. Some 
Ghanaian women have been excluded from working 
on their husband’s cocoa or palm oil farm when he 
can afford non-family labour (Asante, 2021; Teye and 
Nikoi, 2021), presumably to deflect her claims to it 
later. Where women and youths have gained access 
to farms, this has resulted less in consolidation of land 
than in a proliferation of smallholders.
Labour dynamics can intersect with land access in 
less predictable ways as the nature of commercial 
agriculture changes through time, and this influences 
social differentiation over the longer term. This is 
particularly evident in Malawi as men turned to the 
groundnut value chain following the demise of tobacco, 
displacing women from the chain in the process 
(Chinsinga and Matita, 2021). Extended family labour 
and reciprocal or cooperative labour was historically 
important in Nigeria’s cocoa value chain but became 
less so as paid labour became more common, 
especially as cocoa was promoted by government 
as an export (Aiyede, 2021). Farmworkers without 
traditional ethnic or regional ties to cocoa migrated to 
provide labour in cocoa farms. Some gained access 
to land through this, some through renting or leasing 
land. In moments when the price of labour rose 
greatly, labourers who were able to save gained the 
chance to purchase the cocoa land they had worked 
on when land law reform in 1978 made this possible. 
Non-agrarian factors influenced that labour cost: the 
Biafran war and the oil boom slowed the provision of 
labour to cocoa, decreasing cocoa output, as labour 
flowed to the East and to cities. This lack of labour also 
promoted sharecropping, which farm owners saw as a 
way to retain labour.
Conjugal and household relations have a bearing on 
how family labour is used. Married women may have 
more control over money gained from their own wage 
labour than profits from household scale contract 
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farming (Maertens and Swinnen, 2012). Family 
breakdowns can also make female labour less available 
to some male farmers. Women may manipulate 
labour relations to try to escape disadvantage or gain 
advantage, for example, when Ghanaian women were 
disadvantaged by matrilineal land inheritance, they 
withdrew labour from their husband’s cocoa farms, or 
charged for it (Tsikata, 2015). The same may happen in 
the sunflower value chain in Tanzania. Women may find 
it advantageous to continue to promote systems where 
their immediate advantage is not obvious.
In general, women, youth and smallholders are less 
advantaged in terms of profiting from provision of 
labour and accessing it, because they have less 
access to capital over the longer and shorter terms. 
Hall, Scoones and Tskikata (2017) note that women 
and youth often take part in wage labour to diversify 
their livelihood strategy and share risk, but that they 
may then be placed in a more precarious situation if 
they have no capital or land of their own to fall back on. 
These facets of identity and precarities intersect and 
compound as women are likely to be smaller-scale 
farmers. Similar points pertain to migrants in a value 
chain as a consequence of dynamics of migration and 
land access.
The intersectional disadvantage these people 
experience means they often lack opportunities to 
exercise agency in response to labour availability 
shocks like COVID-19. Labour is strongly affected by 
fluctuations in prices of goods, which influences how 
much farmers can pay for labour, which in turn affects 
labour supply, including family, and non-family local 
and migrant labour. Shorter-term changes in the price 
and availability of labour, as happened in response 
to COVID-19, can have especially strong effects for 
smaller-scale farmers, because they generally have 
less capital at their disposal to afford higher labour 
prices. The increased number of smallholders owning 
their own land can exacerbate such labour shortages. 
In Ghana, free secondary school education has 
apparently reduced the pool of available workers (Teye 
and Nikoi, 2021). Women farmers particularly can no 
longer afford to pay for labour and, if not household 
heads, cannot access free labour from young adult 
family members.
In the COVID-19 shock, production was also affected 
by mobility restrictions that prevented labourers 
reaching the fields, for example in the Malawian 
groundnut chain, the Nigerian maize and rice value 
chains, and the cocoa value chain in both Ghana 
and Nigeria (Aiyede, 2021; Amaza, Mailumo and 
Silong, 2021; Teye and Nikoi 2021). Changes in 
labour mobility had varying effects, even within a 
given chain. For example, some Ghanaian palm oil 
farmers and processors reported a surplus of labour 
due to reduced processing operations, whereas 
others reported lack of migrant labour due to reduced 
migration flows (Asante, 2021). Data from another 
data collection effort within APRA showed differential 
effects on labour flows and costs across countries 
(Carreras, Saha and Thompson, 2020). A telephone 
survey specifically on COVID-19 effects reported that 
labourers in Ghana, Nigeria, Tanzania and Zimbabwe 
were still finding it hard to access off-farm work by 
September 2020, with female-headed households in 
Zimbabwe being worse affected than male-headed 
households. Tom (2020) reported that some labour 
markets in Zimbabwe closed temporarily and were 
open again by April 2020. Simultaneously, farmers in 
Ghana, Kenya and Malawi continued to struggle to 
access hired labour, with Ghana, Nigeria, Ethiopia 
and Zimbabwe reporting higher prices. Our own data 
showed that, in some places, labour requirements had 
been largely met by specific groups of people, and in 
these places, restrictions to the movement of labour 
have not only impacted owner-farmers, but also these 
groups of farm labourers. Elsewhere, farmers laid 
workers off, which has a similarly negative effect on 
those who rely on farm labouring for income.
Landless labourers were not able to control whether 
they had access to work or not. For example, in 
Ethiopia’s Fogera plain, rice labour was largely provided 
by young people, who became unable to access this 
income source (Alemu and Assaye, 2021). Those 
who did access work were occasionally able to profit 
from higher labour prices but had to accept the risk 
of catching the disease at work to do so. In Nigeria’s 
maize value chain, those able and willing to work were 
able to demand wages of up to 100 per cent more 
than usual, as the pandemic hit in the sowing season, 
and many other labourers chose to stay at home for 
fear of contracting the virus or were forced to do so by 
movement restrictions (Amaza, Mailumo and Silong, 
2021). This resembles what happened in the Biafran 
war and oil boom, when labour prices rose, enabling 
many labourers to accumulate capital and eventually 
buy land. In this value chain, there were hints that 
smaller-scale businesses used more labour per unit of 
output. In some value chains, crops had already been 
planted by the time the pandemic broke out, so output 
was less threatened. For these value chains, including 
rice in Ethiopia and sunflower in Tanzania, subsequent 
seasons will be more of a concern.
The evidence on labour again shows a situation of 
structural disadvantage for some groups, especially 
women and youth, and the way this works is tied in 
many ways to patterns of land access. Individuals do 
find ways to negotiate more favourable positions within 
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these structures, sometimes by drawing on or engaging 
with alternative structures, such as contract farming.
3.3 Access to credit and capital
The inclusive commercialisation agenda, exemplified by 
CAADP, has encouraged more widespread provision 
and uptake of formal credit routes, with a particular 
focus on women and, to some extent, widening 
access to smallholders who have traditionally lacked 
access to formal credit. For example, Nigeria’s Anchor 
Borrowers Programme has a component focusing on 
smallholders while the Incentive-based Risk Sharing 
System for Agricultural Lending and the Commercial 
Agricultural Credit Scheme continue to target larger 
businesses. Still, credit uptake by smallholders and 
across the agricultural sector in general is lagging, 
and there are allegations in Nigeria that the process is 
riddled with corruption (Aiyede, 2021).
Policies aiming to open up credit to smallholders have 
not had much effect on the real availability of these 
services to the most disadvantaged, probably because 
their effectiveness is also tied to a need for public 
investment (Wiggins et al., 2011; Jayne, Chamberlin 
and Headey, 2014). For example, finance institutions 
find it unattractive to offer credit to smallholders 
living in remote locations poorly served by transport 
and communications infrastructure, as this makes it 
difficult to follow up in instances of default. Much has 
been made of land titling schemes targeting women 
and smallholders, which will ostensibly provide them 
with the ability to pledge their land as collateral for 
agricultural finance. There have been few academic 
reports of the success of such schemes. This may be 
because titling schemes are not yet very widespread, 
or because they are not considered to be of much 
use by smallholders who already enjoy usufruct rights 
to farms, or by medium-scale farmers who can lease. 
Smallholders may not feel the need to engage in 
formal credit when low-interest options are available 
to them, for example from marketers. Credit agencies 
also may find it too risky to lend to such farmers, 
bearing in mind the difficulties of extracting collateral 
in the event of default, especially in contexts where the 
practical and legal structures to do so are weak. There 
are also the ethical considerations of encouraging a 
smallholder to pledge their land as collateral for a loan 
to work on it, in what is an inherently risky business 
(Wiggins et al., 2011).
Many farmers, processors, input suppliers and 
marketers, especially those operating at a smaller 
scale, have longstanding informal and private credit 
relations. These loans are often of small amounts, 
interest free and tied to delivery of goods. For example, 
Tanzanian sunflower producers arrange interest-free 
credit with the Kenyan traders who purchase their 
goods (Isinikah and Jeckoniah, 2021). These small-
scale credit relations may be at least partly guided 
by logics of social reciprocity. Although amounts lent 
are small and rarely provide an opportunity to expand 
a business, considering their relatively generous 
terms they sometimes provide small-scale operators 
with a cushion in the case of shocks, as compared 
to larger, more formal interest-attracting loans with 
fixed repayment schedules (Bellwood-Howard et al., 
2021).  In the Ghanaian cocoa value chain, farmers 
may engage in such relations, but also obtain credit 
through local buying companies (Teye and Nikoi, 
2021). Simultaneously, large agricultural companies 
can obtain agricultural finance from banks, secured to 
land or other collateral. Outgrowers can occasionally 
gain access to loans through other channels. In the 
case of the Zimbabwe tobacco sector, the international 
nature of the value chain provides nucleus companies 
with opportunities to use offshore loans and sell them 
to farmers (Shonhe, 2021).
Access to credit is associated with more ready capital. 
It is possible that those with better capital endowments 
cope better with crises such as COVID-19, as 
resilience capacities involve having the resources to 
weather periods with low sales, for example by waiting 
for markets to re-open, or by investing in alternatives. 
Smallholders who lack access to ready and untied 
credit, are in a disadvantageous position to be able to 
weather such shocks. However, the COVID-19 crisis 
also generated negative effects for those in larger 
businesses who could sit out periods of lower sales. 
Drops in revenue meant that business owners had 
to lay off employees, and many were unable to repay 
credit, as they lost access to export routes and dropped 
contracts. This had knock-on effects for lenders. The 
effects of COVID-19 itself on the availability of credit 
varied widely across countries. Carreras, Saha and 
Thompson (2020) reported that, by July 2020, there 
were decreases in the availability of credit in Ghana 
and increases in Nigeria, Malawi and Zimbabwe.
3.4 Access to other movable inputs 
Though direct government support of farmers with 
inputs has been unpopular since the 1980s, the ‘African 
Green Revolution’ advocacy of the 21st century has 
suggested that it is acceptable to temper an entirely 
liberalised input provision sector with ‘smart subsidies’: 
more targeted, with a specific focus on supporting 
smallholders (Sanchez, Denning and Nziguheba, 2009; 
Nziguheba et al., 2010). Access to movable inputs is 
strongly influenced by political settlements, including 
government interests in creating alliances with private 
sector actors and development partners and gaining 
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the support of voters. The possibility of modernising 
and privatising input support programmes has not 
done away with relations of political patronage from 
government. Tanzania has followed a typical pattern, 
introducing subsidies in the 1960s, removing them in 
the 1980s due to donor pressure, and reintroducing 
them in 2004, partly as an electoral tool (Mdoe and 
Mlay, 2021). In Tanzania, the new configuration explicitly 
aims to generate profit for the private sector, so is less 
vulnerable to claims of nepotism or untoward practice. 
Private sector companies in the fertiliser, seed, 
agrochemical, and machinery industries are now well 
integrated into government input support initiatives, 
as it is claimed that they can supply inputs in a more 
efficient manner. The Nigerian Anchor Borrowers’ 
programme and Agricultural Transformation Agenda 
are examples of this. They are supposed to tackle 
corruption and inefficiencies, and therefore brought 
the private sector into improved seed distribution and 
credit provision, as government procurement had 
been associated with rent seeking. These types of 
schemes are meant to replace the Nigerian Growth 
Enhancement Support Scheme, which provides 
fertilisers, other agrochemicals, and planting materials 
to smallholders. Cooperative organisation membership 
is sometimes helpful or necessary to gain access to 
inputs distributed through such centralised schemes. 
However, the scheme has been criticised for providing 
poor quality inputs, as of late. 
Legislation has been necessary to incentivise the 
private sector in some domains. Recently, a set of seed 
laws has been passed across Africa to enable seed 
patenting, to attract more private sector investment 
in the sector. Examples include the 2019 Nigerian 
National Agricultural Seeds Council Act (NASCA). This 
has been contentious, as activists claim it criminalises 
non-commercial seed procurement. Simultaneously, 
advocates argue that a seed sector which is more 
profitable for researchers, producers and distributors 
will make better quality seed available to smallholders, 
raising their yields and incomes. It is too early to know 
what the longer-term effect will be, although Amaza, 
Mailumo and Silong note that since NASCA was 
passed, in the seeds sub-sector, it is the government 
and seed producing companies that have had the 
highest numerical cost-benefit ratio, with smallholder 
farmers having the lowest (Amaza, Mailumo and 
Silong, 2021, p. 23).
In the context of national and continental scale input 
provision regimes, farmers of different resource 
endowments have different abilities to access inputs. In 
the Malawian groundnut chain, more affluent medium-
scale farmers have been most able to capitalise on 
opportunities in seed innovation, using land to grow 
seed rather than groundnuts. Medium-scale farmers 
who are new entrants to the sector often acquire 
land from smallholder farmers who become landless 
labourers in the process (Chinsinga and Matita, 2021). 
The general government-run schemes can, in practice, 
favour government contacts and voters over the short 
term, but it is hard to observe sustained advantage 
for a particular group as political cycles tend to favour 
different groups over time. 
Outgrower schemes provide an alternative route 
whereby smallholders gain access to inputs, as 
company nucleus farms provide inputs to their 
outgrower farmers, for example the Tanzanian rice 
value chain (Mdoe and Mlay, 2021). Outgrower schemes 
tend to favour those who have the resources to 
become an outgrower in the first place. If implemented 
with the benefit of smallholders in mind, generally they 
will advantage those who have management control 
over land. Women with limited access to resources 
have often lost out in such contracting arrangements 
(Schneider and Gugerty, 2010; FAO, 2011). Schemes 
with a specific focus on gender and smallholder access 
are more targeted; but there is limited evidence that 
they have made a substantial, widespread difference 
for women (Daley and Park, 2012). The style of the 
scheme through which input support is organised 
interacts with the prior resource endowment of a given 
farmer to determine how they benefit. Those with 
access to labour, land, transport, bank accounts, 
mobile phones and knowledge of how to use inputs 
and access systems (e.g. e-platforms) are more able to 
benefit. Access to these resources does not necessarily 
have to mean ownership, and can be through family 
and community members, hence why cooperative 
involvement and high levels of social capital are also 
advantageous. For all schemes, some other kinds of 
public goods, such as road infrastructure, also have 
to be in place (Jayne, Chamberlin and Headey, 2014).
In terms of ability to weather shocks such as COVID-19, 
timely input supply is critical to successful farming. 
Disruptions to input supply place farmers in vulnerable 
positions, especially those who rely on subsidies. In the 
case of COVID-19, movement restrictions in the early 
months of the pandemic also disrupted input supply, 
creating a similar type of problem as the disruption 
of labour did for farmers who were at the production 
stage of their crop cycle when movement restrictions 
came into effect, for example in the rice, maize and 
cocoa value chains in Nigeria, and cocoa and palm oil 
value chains in Ghana. This also had negative effects 
for input suppliers and distributors, who could not 
make sales. Some retailers demonstrated resilience, 
for example those in Zimbabwe who sold their fertilisers 
in smaller bags to be able to maintain a business, 
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but it was harder for farmers to enact these types of 
responses, given that timely planting and harvesting 
is critical to successful production. These disruptions 
were noted by Carreras, Saha and Thompson (2020) to 
be particularly widespread in Nigeria in the early stages 
of the pandemic, and towards the end of September 
2020 in Ethiopia.
For those farmers who had already planted crops, 
production was threatened by the inability to get 
inputs to the field in a timely fashion, given movement 
restrictions. For example, in the Nigerian rice value 
chain, the effects of interstate movement restrictions 
were exacerbated by opportunistic officials harassing 
fertiliser transporters on the roads and increases in 
transport fares (Aiyede, 2021). Fertiliser prices rose 
because of slowdown in production of fertilisers 
produced abroad. Smallholders with lower capital 
stocks are less able to bear these increased costs. 
Simultaneously, low demand was reported by input 
suppliers when farmers, such as in the Ghanaian 
cocoa value chain, were unwilling to travel to urban 
areas to purchase supplies (Teye and Nikoi, 2021). 
The data above show that there is ample room for 
political settlements to influence the structures within 
which individuals access movable inputs, though 
individual value chain actors have some room to 
manoeuvre within the structures created by these 
settlements.
3.5 Access to markets and favourable 
prices
Differential resource endowments of farmers, 
traders and processors shape their ability to access 
markets. Large-scale investors have been drawn into 
commercial farming, sometimes encouraged by tax 
breaks and incentives. In the Tanzanian sunflower 
sector, for example, oil producers were attracted to 
invest in production in reaction to import taxes on a 
competitor product, imported palm oil. Some develop 
outgrower programmes, often providing inputs and 
sometimes credit, thereby passing on some of the 
benefits for investors to outgrowers. In this way, 
outgrowing can provide ways for smallholders to 
access inputs while being guaranteed an output 
market. Smallholders tend to achieve more short-term 
gains when they are supported by governments, which 
often happens around election times in attempts to 
win favour and votes. However, outgrower schemes 
can sometimes alter this dynamic, where they allow 
smallholders to take advantage of the ability of larger 
players to forge ahead in competitive markets. This has 
happened in the Nigerian rice value chain and in the 
Tanzanian sunflower value chain (Aiyede, 2021; Isinika 
and Jeckoniah, 2021). 
One disadvantage of outgrower schemes is that 
smallholders may become tied to selling to a specific 
buyer if they accept inputs from them. On the other 
hand, in many cases, as in the Ghana palm oil value 
chain, side-selling by smallholders is widespread 
(Asante, 2021). Many smallholders sell on these open 
markets, or ‘decentralised markets’ (Wiggins, 2011). 
Despite inefficiencies and a lack of supportive policies, 
many smallholders have maintained longstanding 
relations with local traders or engaged in regular spot 
markets over years and decades (Mutabazi, Wiggins 
and Mdoe, 2013). Public investment in irrigation, 
fertiliser subsidy or infrastructure, such as roads and 
electricity that would make such engagement more 
efficient, has not always been forthcoming. An example 
of where this has happened, however, is the Singida 
region in Tanzania, where general development, 
including electrification, promoted the development of 
sunflower oil processing (Isinika and Jeckoniah, 2021).
Such local, small-scale markets do not necessarily 
provide opportunities to make large profits. Lack 
of standardisation and regulation may also provide 
space for marketers to exploit small-scale farmers, for 
example, by manipulating weights, as is described for 
the rice value chain in Ethiopia (Alemu and Thompson, 
2020). Yet they have relatively low entry barriers and 
provide a route to market for smallholders and traders 
(often women) who have not gained access to the 
outgrower or export markets above, or who are not 
supported by governments with targeted subsidies, 
irrigation schemes or other infrastructural investments. 
These markets would be a logical intervention point 
for other actors seeking to improve the terms for the 
smallest and poorest farmers and traders.
Poor farmers and traders may benefit less from targeted 
agricultural interventions such as credit and fertilisers 
than from general infrastructural development such 
as roads, transport electrification, and possibly import 
substitution by import tariffs (Wiggins et al., 2011). 
Although individuals may use social relations and 
negotiations within such markets in order to gain relative 
advantage, appropriate infrastructure is still necessary 
to make conditions more generally advantageous for 
all market actors. In situations of bifurcated markets, 
for example the internal and export markets in the 
palm oil chain in Ghana and the rice chain in Tanzania, 
the ability of different groups to access these markets 
will determine the prices and advantages they can 
gain from commercialisation. In the case of palm oil 
in Ghana, those who do not have capital to invest in 
the varieties of palm preferred by external markets 
will not be able to trade in export markets and gain 
access to higher prices. Market actors who cannot 
engage in markets which provide favourable prices will 
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be relatively disadvantaged. This has happened over 
the longer term for many and, simultaneously, longer-
term patterns of differentiation have prevented some 
from gaining or retaining access to the most favourable 
market opportunities in shocks.
A sudden change in access to markets and favourable 
prices was the most immediate effect of the COVID-19 
shock. Carreras, Saha and Thompson (2020) found 
that farmers in all APRA countries except Ethiopia 
found it harder to sell goods since COVID-19 although, 
in Nigeria and Zimbabwe, this had improved by 
September 2020. Our data showed that those who 
were embedded in local markets retained the ability 
to trade to a greater extent than those dependent 
on export markets. Simultaneously, those with more 
capital, sometimes provided by access to credit, were 
able to sit out a period of non-access to markets or 
unfavourable prices, and sometimes even profit by 
stockpiling, in anticipation of a return to trading at 
higher prices. Tom (2020) points out that Zimbabwean 
farmers exercised agency in the face of market closures, 
turning to selling on the roadside and in other unofficial 
places. Reduced mobility and inability of goods to 
leave the farm gate negatively affected farmers, who 
relied on being able to sell on to small- and large-scale 
traders. Traders themselves could not gain access to 
crops and had reduced opportunities to make sales. 
In Tanzania, for example, not only was less sunflower 
oil purchased from villages, but less traffic on the 
roads meant that opportunities to make roadside sales 
declined, posing problems for small-scale informal 
traders and farmers (Isinikah and Jeckoniah, 2021). 
Ragasa and Lambrecht (2020) point out that distribution 
problems disproportionately affected women traders, 
who frequently dominate informal food markets, and 
governments did not always adopt a gender-specific 
approach in response. Alemu and Thompson (2020) 
report how farmer stockpiling had, in anticipation of 
preferable prices, forced many aggregators out of rice 
markets. Simultaneously, many processors switched 
to purchasing and stockpiling paddy.
There were knock-on effects for processors and 
exporters. In Ghana, border closures led to cocoa 
stockpiles (Teye and Nikoi, 2021). Transport costs 
increased as drivers were stopped from moving or were 
less willing to risk their health on the road. This affected 
all value chain actors, from farmers to exporters. The 
few drivers who remained on the roads profited from 
greater competition for their services, while others lost 
income. Where there were food security effects, these 
were more a result of transporters and traders being 
unable to move food to markets, and workers being 
unable to gain cash to purchase food with, rather than 
harvests being disrupted by low labour availability at 
planting. The latter effect may be more relevant in the 
coming season.
Effects on prices varied across and between countries, 
influenced by a complex set of factors, including a 
crop’s import and export status and the change in 
demand for it. Farmers and traders in various locations 
were affected in unpredictable ways, conditioned by 
existing value chain dynamics, including whether the 
crop in question could be sold locally or to a different 
buyer, and its role in national food systems. Because 
farmers normally benefit from higher prices, and 
consumers from lower prices, the ability of government 
to set prices is a major tool in whether they can gain 
the support of these groups. It is therefore dangerous 
for government when prices fluctuate beyond their 
control, as happened in the COVID-19 shock.
Where governments included food crops in emergency 
relief packages, increases in demand advantaged 
farmers, traders, and processors to a certain extent, 
for example in the case of rice millers in Nigeria 
(Aiyede, 2021). In Ethiopia, imports of basmati rice 
from Asia declined, so prices rose, and some farmers 
and traders stockpiled or held rice back, anticipating 
prices that had already risen would rise further. In this 
case, the low availability of the product, rather than the 
price rise, created problems for traders (Alemu and 
Assaye, 2021). The Nigerian government discourages 
the maize trade, focusing instead on self-sufficiency. 
Nevertheless, slightly more maize is imported than 
exported, and the price rose during the pandemic 
(Amaza, Mailumo and Silong, 2021). In these situations, 
farmers benefited from the price increases, at least 
while demand remained high. However, traders were 
less able to purchase as much to sell on and consumer 
food security was affected.
Decreases in trade, including exports, lowered prices. In 
Malawi, ADMARC markets were affected, which made 
it more difficult for farmers to dispose of groundnuts, 
forcing them to sell to middlemen and market brokers at 
very low prices (Chinsinga and Matita, 2021). In Ghana, 
there was reduced demand for palm oil from restaurants 
and school feeding programmes, as well as a pause 
in exports. Overproduction at the international level 
also contributed to the overall decrease in prices. The 
decreased demand and lower prices disadvantaged 
exporters, small-scale producers, processors, and 
traders (Asante, 2021). By comparison, in Zimbabwe, 
maize is an important local and national food item. 
While larger-scale long-distance traders were unable to 
access farms, which led to price drops overall, farmers 
were able to switch to alternative local buyers if sales 
fell through (Shonhe, 2021). In Tanzania, it was reported 
that farm gate sunflower oil prices fell due to fewer 
traders travelling to villages to source goods, reducing 
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competition; as well as the reluctance of neighbouring 
countries to admit Tanzanian trucks, partly because 
Tanzania did not enforce a lockdown. Cross border 
sellers could therefore not trade, and trucks that did 
travel were slowed down due to extra checks. Traders 
could not obtain credit for sunflower seed cake, so the 
cake price also dropped (Isinika and Jeckoniah, 2021). 
Tanzania also exports rice, so prices similarly dropped 
as regional exports became less possible and goods 
stockpiled (Mdoe and Mlay, 2021). This also happened 
even in cases where theoretically there were no 
restrictions on food crops moving across the border, 
for example in the cocoa value chain in Nigeria and 
Ghana. Here, warehouses filled up, leaving farmers 
unable to sell on their goods, and creating backlogs on 
farms (Aiyede, 2021; Teye and Nikoi, 2021).
There is some evidence that smaller processing 
businesses and smallholders were less able to cope 
with price changes than those with larger holdings or 
reserves. In Tanzania, larger-scale farmers were able 
to stockpile large amounts of rice for future sale or sell 
smaller amounts in a more local market when they 
could not export (Mdoe and Mlay, 2021). In contrast, 
smallholders and women informal traders were 
often less able to take advantage of price changes. 
In Tanzania, women are the major informal traders 
and tend to lack access to formal social safety nets, 
which meant that they could not afford to wait for 
sales by stockpiling. In Ghana, smaller-scale palm oil 
processors rely on the ability to sell quickly to survive 
and could not benefit from stockpiling oil (Asante, 
2021). In Zimbabwe, smallholders found it impossible 
to stockpile maize, but managed by selling small 
portions at lower prices (Shonhe, 2021). 
The papers that this working paper draws upon 
provide several examples of negotiation and resilience 
capacity of individuals and small groups. However, the 
data also show that elite actions and, often, political 
settlements, at higher levels shape the structures that 
these individuals act within.
3.6 Access to alternative and non-
agricultural opportunities
The COVID-19 response showed that the fate of 
agricultural value chain actors is conditioned by 
factors both within and beyond the agricultural sector. 
Those who have abilities and capacities for resilience 
were able to move position within the value chain 
or even move to non-agricultural activities. Actors 
working at the smallest scale are often pursuing 
multifunctional livelihoods. Whilst lacking the capital 
stocks and access to safety nets that can enhance 
their robustness to shocks, they may have skills to 
support a resilient response, including experiences 
learnt from past shocks, for example price fluctuations 
or new regulations that forbid or encourage imports. 
For many agricultural value chain actors in Africa, 
COVID-19 will not be the most severe shock they have 
experienced, while simultaneously resembling other 
shocks in some ways. Other shocks, for example 
locusts, drought, war, market collapse and land loss, 
have highlighted the existing distribution of power 
and capital in a value chain, as well as the resilience 
of people engaged in agricultural value chains and 
livelihoods that are unpredictable.
In the study countries, some actors responded to 
COVID-19 by moving into activities at another point in 
the value chain; some moved to activities linked to their 
value chain; some moved out of agriculture; and some 
moved to other value chains. Responses often reflect 
the opportunities and pressures that already confront 
these people. For example, while some Ghanaian palm 
oil producers were able to scale down production and 
store processed palm oil, smallholders elsewhere 
were unable to stockpile as they rely on regular sales 
(Asante, 2021). Tanzanian sunflower oil producers 
reported switching to other crops as oil prices dropped 
(Isinika and Jeckoniah, 2021), although this only works 
if those other crops have not been similarly negatively 
affected by COVID-19. This response will have been 
especially important for women, as Mosha et al. (2021) 
report that diversification of sunflower-related livelihood 
activities led to increased women’s empowerment. In 
Ghana, some palm oil producers switched to activities 
related to the commodity they deal with, for example 
soap production. Some even turned to social media 
advertising to remain within the value chain (Asante, 
2021). Others in Tanzania moved into non-agricultural 
activities, for example opportunistically making or 
selling face masks or hand sanitiser. In Malawi this also 
happened on a larger scale, with well-established Afri-
SMEs positioning themselves with local government, 
non-governmental organisations, and community-
based organisations to supply COVID-19 products 
and services, including personal protective equipment 
(Chinsinga and Matita, 2021).
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Long-term patterns of social differentiation are shaped, 
directly and indirectly, by government policies and 
their interaction with development trends, value chain 
structures and processes of social and agrarian 
change. Advantage can be conferred to certain groups 
when governments make a concerted long-term effort 
to shape land and agricultural markets, control imports 
and exports, or provide inputs and facilitate other kinds 
of access to resources. However, such interventions 
have little meaningful impact when carried out over the 
short term.
In the current era of land market liberalisation and 
commercialisation of African agriculture, governments 
and international actors have often pursued 
interventions that benefit the more powerful actors in 
value chains, for example through facilitating access to 
land markets, tariff and tax concessions, seed laws, or 
fertiliser subsidy privatisation. These are often rooted in 
political settlements that allow those with more assets 
to become or remain larger-scale farmers. Larger-
scale agricultural investors, including processors and 
traders, also benefit, as well as traditional authorities 
in some cases. 
In the case of smallholders, governments have tended 
to interact politically in more short-term ways, for 
example by providing inputs or export bans at politically 
sensitive times. Otherwise, smallholders tend to use 
their own resources to commercialise, where public 
goods such as roads, healthcare and childcare, which 
are necessary to make markets work for smallholders, 
have not consistently been developed to the extent 
that is needed. But critiques of political settlements 
literature remind us that we also need to look at these 
actions of smallholders to understand how the agency 
of non-elites affects their own trajectories. The ways 
smaller-scale marketers, farmers and processors 
managed through the COVID-19 period provide 
examples of agency and resilience capacity, whether 
by switching to new trading partners, sales modes, or 
crops, or even moving into non-agricultural activities.
Nevertheless, commercialisation in any form is likely 
to cause differentiation, entrenching existing patterns 
over the medium and long term (Wiggins, 2011). The 
greater the degree of commercialisation, the greater 
the differentiation. Smaller-scale traders can be made 
worse off in real terms when larger scale marketers 
outcompete them, for example in preferential access 
to lucrative export markets, which was reported 
to different extents in the APRA study countries. 
However, larger-scale farmers and smaller-scale 
farmers can also interact with each other in more 
complementary ways, such as in the case of the more 
inclusive outgrower or contract farming schemes. In 
these ways, actors exercise agency within processes 
and structures of commercialisation.
Land tenure systems linked to kinship relations continue 
to have the most significant structural long-term effect 
on who benefits from commercial agriculture and 
how. Across the APRA countries, agrarian structures 
embedded in gendered social power relations, mean 
that women are less likely to own land or to be a 
larger business owner. Women are more likely to be 
smallholder farmers or labourers because of their 
historically weaker access to land. Women in general 
are more likely to provide unpaid care than men, 
leaving them with less time to run their businesses. 
In some contexts, they are less likely to own heavy 
plant machinery, and are therefore overrepresented 
in artisanal and less lucrative sectors, for example 
in the palm oil value chain in Ghana (Asante, 2021). 
Women farmers tend to earn less than men and are 
less likely to have access to the higher prices available 
in international markets. In Ghana, for example, women 
cocoa farmers earn on average 25-30 per cent less 
than men (Teye and Nikoi, 2021). As traders, in many 
contexts there is a tradition of women dominating local 
and national scale markets. Yet, these women traders, 
like women farmers, are less likely than men to gain 
access to larger amounts of credit which are available 
through formal channels. Women traders are also less 
likely to be engaging in lucrative global value chains. 
However, some government and civil society actors 
have sought to favour women in value chains through 
schemes such as the Cadbury Cocoa Partnership and 
Cocoa Life in Ghana, which seek to increase business 
opportunities for women and youth.
Ethnicity and migrancy/local citizenship also 
cause differentiation in access to land and labour 
opportunities. In many cases, migrants may, at least 
in the short term, often only have the option to lease 
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land or engage in more precarious sharecropping 
agreements, as in the Ghanaian cocoa sector. 
However, in other contexts such as Malawi, migrant 
entrepreneurs have come to dominate informal 
export markets and acquire the resources to invest in 
technological innovations. The relationship between 
ethnicity and land is not necessarily a given and may 
change over time. In Nigeria, the shift from communal 
land tenure to private property relations has in turn 
altered the conditions for migrant labourers, to one of 
short-term contracts. At the same time, ethnicity has 
been politically important in terms of connections to 
powerful state actors and it is now possible for some 
migrant farmers to go on to purchase land.
In Zimbabwe, the land reforms of FTLRP 2000 
made ethnicity and citizenship the defining axis of 
social differentiation, formally classifying farmers into 
three groups (A1, A2, and CA farmers). Following the 
displacement of white settler farmers, A2 farmers 
accumulate from above through patronage and 
access to inputs and labour support, while A1 farmers 
accumulate from below through reinvestment of sale 
proceeds. Therefore, while land relations are the most 
important long-term process through which agrarian 
social differentiation occurs, it is not necessarily taken 
for granted that larger landowners will be better able 
to survive a shock. Their larger resource endowment, 
particularly in terms of financial capital, means that 
they can bear a disruption in trading caused by a 
shock such as COVID-19. Yet, the relation between 
land and the ability to withstand a shock depends on 
the nature of the shock itself: the same patterns will not 
hold if the shock concerned the land itself, such as the 
redistribution of land in Zimbabwe.
In order to understand the differentiation resulting 
from commercialisation, attention must be paid to the 
political processes structuring systems of access to 
market, land, labour and inputs. These often involve 
political settlements between elites. However, it is 
equally important to understand the negotiations of 
individuals which often inform their resilience within 
these structures. Analyses limited to the macro-
perspective of the political settlements approach 
can fail to account for the negotiations of non-elite 
but important actors such as female traders, or the 
makoronyera of Zimbabwe, who have an important 
role to play. Consideration of the domestic sphere, or 
non-rational market logics, help analysts understand 
how outcomes may be reshaped for individuals in 
any given settlement. This attention to non-elites may 
be especially important when understanding how 
women are engaged or marginalised through different 
structures and processes (O’Rourke 2017). With 
particular attention to land, Peters (2004) has warned 
against placing too much emphasis on agential tactics, 
and for attention to be maintained to how state level 
processes of resource access contribute to class 
formation. The point is not to focus on one level of 
interaction, but to understand how local level and 
interpersonal negotiations take place within general, 
politically organised structures which confer advantage 
on given groups.
The effects of the COVID-19 pandemic have overlaid 
patterns of social differentiation that shape access to 
resources, markets, and other opportunities for those 
involved in commercial agriculture. These longer-term 
patterns interact with people’s abilities and capacities to 
deal with shocks such as COVID-19. Findings from the 
value chain studies discussed in this paper, show that 
larger businesses had greater resilience capacities to 
deal with the immediate effects of COVID-19 on access 
to markets and labour. This is because they have been 
advantaged over the longer term by processes of land 
distribution and sometimes by support in accessing 
markets, to the extent that they have accumulated the 
capital to be able to respond to a slowdown in trade 
and unfavourable prices. Larger or more successful 
businesses with access to a reasonable amount of 
liquid capital, rather than only land or plant holding, 
could use it to stockpile goods, buy up cheap goods, 
pay higher transport costs and storage charges, or just 
withstand a period of no trading. Pre-existing patterns 
of social differentiation mean that those who are more 
able to deal with brief shocks are more likely to be men, 
indigene farmers, and those who are already older or 
wealthier. Those who have larger businesses for other 
reasons are also included.
The way gender, ethnicity and migrancy as facets of 
identity interact with processes of social differentiation 
in the face of shocks depends on the nature of the 
shock and the nature of a group or individual’s 
resource access capability. Women, migrants, and 
the poor, as intersecting social groups who are more 
likely to be labourers than landowners, continue to 
be, overall, structurally disadvantaged by land tenure 
systems and political settlements that have shaped the 
agrarian sector over the long term. The result is that 
as women are more likely to be small-scale business 
owners and have smaller capital reserves and other 
resilience capacities to withstand the effects of shocks 
like COVID-19 or turn them to their advantage. Smaller 
businesses are also less likely to be able to access 
temporary business relief packages such as loans. 
However, women and migrants who are successful 
traders or large-account farmers are less likely to 
suffer these effects and will have resilience capacities 
that are comparable to the more advantaged groups 
described above.
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In the first year of the pandemic, COVID-19 itself had 
the type of short-term effects that result from short-
term market changes such as price changes, export 
bans, or input provision shocks. Early data did not 
show that COVID-19 had caused changes that could 
have a longer-term impact on agrarian relations, 
such as distress land sales or permanent migration. 
However, these types of eventualities could become 
possible as COVID-19 becomes endemic, and unequal 
access to vaccines globally reinforce structural 
inequalities in the rate at which different countries 
are able to recover from the pandemic. It would then 
become more of a stress than a shock. For the time 
being, COVID-19 is more of a shock that accentuates 
existing longer-term patterns of social differentiation. 
In the medium to long term, the effects of COVID-19 
are less predictable. Flows of aid are being affected 
as some developed countries, including the United 
Kingdom, which have racked up huge debts from 
dealing with crises at home, seek to reduce their aid 
budgets. Simultaneously some debt repayments, for 
example to the IMF, have been paused. These policies, 
which are also driven by political settlements, confer 
relative advantage on different groups and will continue 
to contribute to patterns and structures that shape 
social differentiation.
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